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IN THE 
SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
T H E S T A T E OF U T A H , 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
In the Interest of: 
R I C K Y L E E JACKSON, a minor, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
B R I E F OF R E S P O N D E N T 
S T A T E M E N T OF 
T H E N A T U R E OF T H E CASE 
The defendant, Ricky Lee Jackson, appeals from 
a finding of guilty in the Second District Juvenile Court 
of one count of manslaughter in violation of Title 76, 
Chapter 5, Section 205, Utah Code Ann. (Supp. 1973), 
and two counts of aggravated assault in violation of 
Title 76, Chapter 5, Section 103, Utah Code Ann. 
(Supp. 1973). 
D I S P O S I T I O N I N T H E L O W E R COURT 
On October 30, 1973, Judge Regnal Garff found 
Case No. 
13661 
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the defendant not guilty of second degree murder, but 
found him guilty of one count of manslaughter (volun-
tary manslaughter under the old Code), and two counts 
of aggravated assault (formerly assault with a deadly 
weapon). Defendant was ordered committed to the 
State Industrial School. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent seeks an affirmance of the decision of 
the Juvenile Court. 
S T A T E M E N T OF FACTS 
Respondent disputes appellant's statement of facts 
as being biased and argumentive and will restate them. 
On the night of August 21, 1973, appellant and 
three companions were driving north out of Tooele city 
limits. At the same time, Tito Alfonso Suazo, and three 
passengers in his car, were proceeding north out of 
Tooele's city limits behind appellant's vehicle. Mr. 
Suazo, with some difficulty, passed appellant's car, and 
shortly thereafter appellant twice collided into the back 
of Mr. Suazo's vehicle (R. 243). Mr. Suazo stopped 
his car and he and his companions got out and approach-
ed appellant's car. When Mr. Suazo was at, or near, 
the driver's door of appellant's car, appellant fired two 
shots into Mr. Suazo's chest (R. 134, 143). Appellant 
then got out of his vehicle, and gun in hand, approached 
where Mr. Suazo had fallen (R. 246). At this juncture 
appellant was grabbed from behind by one of Mr. 
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Suazo's companions. Another of Mr. Suazo's compan-
ions, Paul Mondragen, who had been crouched behind 
the Suazo car during the initial shooting, then stood 
up and was shot in the chest by appellant (R. 249). 
Appellant and Elmer Gonzales, who had grabbed him, 
then fell to the ground where appellant succeeded in 
turning the gun and shot Mr. Gonzales in the chest 
(R. 250). 
Tito Alfonso Suazo was pronounced dead on arri-
val at Tooele Valley Hospital. Paul Mondragen and 
Elmer Gonzales were seriously injured but have re-
covered. Neither the appellant nor his companions were 
injured in any way. 
A R G U M E N T 
P O I N T I 
A. S E L F D E F E N S E A N D J U S T I F I C A -
TION W E R E NOT E S T A B L I S H E D F R O M 
T H E E V I D E N C E P R E S E N T E D AS A MAT-
T E R O F LAW. 
A. T H E I S S U E OF S E L F D E F E N S E 
A N D J U S T I F I C A T I O N ARE, W H E N T H E 
E V I D E N C E IS I N CONFLICT, TO B E D E -
T E R M I N E D BY T H E F I N D E R OF FACT. 
Appellant has suggested that self defense was 
established as a matter of law. This contention is clearly 
erroneous under both Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-402, 
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(Supp. 1973), and under case law which has developed 
the standards of self defense in Utah. 
Appellant would like this court to believe that 
whenever a party believes his life to be in danger he can 
respond with deadly force and kill with impunity. The 
crucial element of self defense and justification, which 
is glossed over by appellant, is that the belief must be 
reasonable. This standard of reasonableness is, as the 
Utah cases show, not a personal subjective standard, but 
rather, an objective ''reasonable man" standard. The 
question to be asked is not: Did this individual appre-
hend to kill or seriously injure on the part of an assailant, 
but would a reasonable man in the same circumstances 
have perceived the need to resort to deadly force in 
order to protect himself or another from death or serious 
bodily injury. As this Court said in State v. Terrell, 55 
Utah 314,186 P . 108 (1919), 
" Something more, however, is required 
under our statute than a bare fear on the part 
of the slayer that an offense is about to be 
committed against his habitation, person or 
property. 
"But the circumstances must be sufficient 
to excite the fears of a reasonable person, and 
the party killing must have acted wholly under 
the influence of such fears." Id. at 111. (Em-
phasis added). 
The concurring opinion in Terrell, supra, states this 
"reasonable man" standard more emphatically still, 
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"I t is not sufficient, however, for the 
slayer merely to say that the danger appeared 
actual or real to him. Unless it appears from 
all facts and circumstances in evidence that 
the slayer had good or sufficient cause to be-
lieve that there was imminent danger he may 
not take life with impunity." Id. at 113. 
This concept of reasonableness was reiterated by this 
Court in State v. Turner, 95 Utah 129, 79 P.2d 46 
(1938), and State v. Law, 106 Utah 196, 147 P.2d 324 
(1944). see also, Utah Code Ann. § 76-30-11 (1953). 
Contrary to appellant's assertion, a slayer's act is 
judged by hindsight to determine whether the total 
circumstances justified the quantum of force which was 
resorted to. In assessing the evidence which has been 
adduced there can be no doubt that self defense was not 
established as a matter of law. The uncontradicted evi-
dence of record shows only that Mr. Suazo passed appel-
lant's car, that appellant collided with the rear of the 
Suazo car two times, that Mr. Suazo and his companions 
got out of their vehicle and approached appellant's car 
where Mr. Suazo was slain and two others grieviously 
injured. 
Those circumstances which appellant contends were 
sufficient to cause appellant to fear death or serious 
bodily injury were contradicted by members of the 
Suazo party and other evidence. Appellant, and one of 
his passengers, contended that the members of the Suazo 
vehicle were throwing bottles at them. This was contra-
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dieted by both Earl Mondragen (R. 148) and Paul 
Mondragen (R. 172), of the Suazo party. Officer Park, 
of the sheriff's department, testified after examining 
appellant's car that he could perceive no dents or paint 
chips on the left side of the vehicle where appellant 
claimed to have been hit by a bottle (R. 217). The testi-
mony of Mr. Miner does not support appellant as the 
location of the driveway on the west side of the road, 
where he testified a bottle hit prior to the altercation, 
would make it seem more likely that it was either thrown 
from the appellant's vehicle or from deceased's vehicle 
away from that of appellant (R. 99-102). The weight 
of the testimony did not support appellant on this issue. 
Appellant also testified that he was being strangled. 
This is uncorroborated by any other source. One of his 
companions, Jerry Caldwell, said only that someone had 
a hand in the car and was "trying to get Rick out" (R.-
210, 215). This was contradicted by Earl Mondragen 
(R. 132). 
Even if Tito Alfonso Suazo was at the door of ap-
pellant's car, and even if he did have his hand upon ap-
pellant, it is evident that the appellant had chosen to use 
deadly force before any need for it was perceived, if, in 
fact, any need ever arose. Jerry Caldwell, appellant's 
passenger, testified that the appellant asked him to get 
the gun out just after they had been passed by the de-
ceased's car (R. 201, 203). Appellant himself testified 
that he got his gun before being approached by anyone, 
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"I got my gun as soon as I hit." (Second collision, R. 
245). 
What emerges from this evidence is the fact that 
the case is certainly not so clear cut as to remove the 
decision from the finder of fact and rule as a matter 
of law. An examination of the Utah cases dealing with 
self defense and justification leave little doubt that the 
issue, when the testimony and the evidence is conflicting, 
is to be determined by the finder of fact. State v. Law, 
supra. 
" . . . if there is room for reasonable minds 
to differ as to whether there is reasonable 
grounds to apprehend a design to . . . do some 
great bodily injury and there is imminent dan-
ger of such design being accomplished the ques-
tion is one for the jury." Id. at 327. 
"The matter of self defense, that is, 
whether the homicide was justifiable, was 
clearly a question for the jury." Id. at 328. 
The fact that this was a juvenile court proceeding 
with the judge acting as the finder of fact did not ren-
der this trial defective. As early as Mill v. Brown, 31 
Utah 473, 88 P. 609 (1907), this Court held that no 
procedural or constitutional defect was engendered be-
cause of a nonjury trial in a juvenile case. Great weight 
should be attached to the decision rendered by a trial 
court or jury in its finding of fact, for it is they who 
can weigh the testimony and judge the credibility of 
witnesses first hand. I t is a general rule of law that upon 
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review the findings of a jury or trial court (as to wheth-
er or not a defendant acted in self defense) will not be 
disturbed unless the weight of the evidence is preponder-
antly against the verdict, and the judgment thereon 
clearly appears to be wrong, State v. Sullivan, 6 Utah 
2d 110, 307 P.2d 212 (1957), McDaniels v. State, 62 
Ariz. 339,158 P.2d 151 (1945). 
Respondent respectfully submits that the record 
shows that there is sufficient evidence upon which the 
trial court legitimately fashioned its decision. This ap-
plies to both the finding of guilty as to manslaughter and 
aggravated assault. Appellant has suggested that the 
trial court erred in finding that appellant had become 
the aggressor. The record fails to support appellant in 
that contention. The evidence shows that appellant got 
out of his car after shooting Tito Alfonso Suazo twice 
in the chest, and gun in hand, pursued Suazo to where 
he had fallen (R. 246). Then waving the gun, he ordered 
the companions of Suazo to abandon their injured friend 
(R. 162, 175). I t is evident from the circumstances that 
Suazo's companinons could reasonably believe them-
selves to be under attack after seeing their friend shot, 
and consequently felt the need to defend themselves. 
Both the appellant and Jerry Caldwell, his passenger, 
testified that they never saw the deceased or his com-
panions with any weapons in their hands at any time 
(R. 200, 201, 260, 261). Respondent submits that it is 
highly unlikely than an unarmed man would attack an 
armed person who has already shown his deadly intent 
unless it was to protect himself or his fallen comrad. 
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POINT I I 
A. THE TRIAL JUDGE DID NOT MIS-
APPLY THE BURDEN WHEN DEFENDANT 
SOUGHT TO ESTABLISH SELF DEFENSE 
AND JUSTIFICATION. 
B. T H E E V I D E N C E S U B M I T T E D I N 
T R I A L COURT F A I L E D TO R A I S E A REA-
SONABLE DOUBT AS TO T H E Q U E S T I O N 
OF S E L F D E F E N S E . 
Appellant has correctly stated the law in contend-
ing that one claiming self defense and justification need 
not establish his defense by a preponderance of the evi-
dence, but need only raise a reasonable doubt as to 
whether or not he acted in self defense. State v. Harris, 
58 Utah 331, 199 P. 145 (1921). However, respondent 
contends that the trial judge was aware of that burden 
and did not misapply it. The trial judge's statement 
upon rendering judgment reveals only that, from the 
evidence submitted, no reasonable doubt was raised as 
to the issue of self defense. 
"The first comment I want to make is 
that the court has rejected the idea or the de-
fense of self defense. The court is not con-
vinced from the evidence that has been pro-
duced that Rickey Jackson reasonably be-
lieved that the shooting was necessary to pre-
vent death or serious bodily injury to him or 
the others in his car." (R. 310). 
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I t does not show, as appellant contends, that the judge 
thought that the defendant had to prove self defense 
beyond a reasonable doubt. 
The facts in evidence do not show sufficient 
grounds to justify the resort to deadly force. They do 
not establish that Rickey Lee Jackson was being 
strangled. What is apparent from the appellant's own 
testimony is that he was excited and afraid, and not 
necessarily from what had taken place that evening. He 
testified that he was afraid that he might have X,s carved 
on him (R. 277, 278), and yet both he and his fellow 
passenger testified that they had seen no weapons of 
any kind. Jerry Caldwell testified that he was scared 
yes, but stated, "Because I didn't know what would 
happen to us." (R. 207). Utah Code Ann. § 76-30-11 
(1953) states that a bare fear will not justify the resort 
to deadly force, and this has been the law since at least 
1919. State v. Terrell, supra. Respondent submits that 
even if appellant did have just grounds for apprehen-
sion, he did not reasonably resort to deadly force under 
the circumstances. The trial judge, from the evidence, 
correctly ruled that no reasonable doubt as to self de-
fense was raised. 
P O I N T I I I 
T H E L A N G U A G E I N U T A H CODE ANN., 
SECTION 76-5-103 (SUPP. 1973), IS C L E A R 
A N D UNAMBIGUOUS, A N D D O E S D E F I N E 
T H E COMMISSION OF A P U B L I C O F F E N S E ; 
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NO V I O L A T I O N OF E S T A B L I S H E D L A W 
OCCURRED I N C H A R G I N G A N D F I N D I N G 
D E F E N D A N T G U I L T Y OF T H I S O F F E N S E . 
This issue is presently before the Utah Supreme 
Court in State v. Archuletta, Case No. 13579. Respon-
dent contends that the disposition of that case will re-
solve any impediment to the affirmance of defendant's 
conviction of aggravated assault based upon the sup-
posed ambiguity of the statute in question. The trial 
court supported by the evidence determined that the 
appellant became the aggressor and with a deadly wea-
pon caused serious bodily injury to two persons in clear 
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-103(1) (a) and (b). 
Appellant's conviction of aggravated assault should be 
affirmed. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated above respondent requests 
the affirmance of the juvenile court decisions as to both 
manslaughter and aggravated assault. 
Respectfully submitted, 
VERNON B. R O M N E Y 
Attorney General 
M. R E I D R U S S E L L 
Chief Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Respondent 
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